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Simulations of the n-player Prisoner’s Dilemma in multiple populations reveal that
Simpson’s paradox can emerge in such game-theoretic situations. The relative proportion
of cooperators can decrease in each separate sub-population, while the proportion of
cooperators in the total population can nonetheless increase, at least transiently. Factors
that determine the longevity of this effect are under investigation. The increase of
altruistic behavior exhibited in these simulations is not based on reciprocal altruism, as
there are no strategies conditional on other players’ past actions, nor does it depend on
kin selection via inclusive fitness, as there are no genes. This model is very general in
that it can represent both biological and social non-zero sum situations in which utility
(fitness) depends upon conditions at different hierarchical levels. The two parameters of
the prisoner’s dilemma in this model, which determine the gain in individual utility for
defection and the dependence of utility on collective cooperation, are respectively
analogous to within-group and between-group selective forces in multilevel selection
theory.
Keywords Simpson’s paradox, prisoner’s dilemma, group selection, multilevel selection,
tragedy of the commons
Introduction
A long-smoldering controversy in evolutionary biology involves the evolution of
altruistic behavior and the possibility of multilevel selection. For simplicity, one often
considers just two levels where selection of a trait, i.e. altruistic behavior, is the joint
result of within-group (individual) and between-group selection (see, e.g., Price 1970).
This view, more generally called multilevel selection theory, was initiated by David
Sloan Wilson (1975, 1976, 1977) and supported by the empirical experiments and
analyses of Michael J. Wade (1977, 1978, 1979). It differs significantly from the idea of
species adaptations that ignited the group-selection controversy (e.g., Wynne-Edwards
1962). In a recent book, Unto Others, Sober and Wilson (1998) review the history of this
controversy and the main alternative theories. These include reciprocal altruism (Trivers
In Proceedings of The WorldCongress of the Systems Sciences and ISSS 2000, Allen, J.K. and Wilby,
J.M. eds., Toronto, Canada: International Society for the Systems Sciences.
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1971) and kin selection via gene-level inclusive fitness (Hamilton 1964, 1975, 1987).
Sober and Wilson also highlight how the counterintuitive result of Simpson’s paradox,
where a trait can decrease within groups, but increase overall, bears on the group
selection controversy (1998, pp. 23-25). There is also considerable discussion on the
extent to which multilevel selection theory, inclusive fitness, and reciprocal altruism are
equivalent explanations (see, e.g., Sober and Wilson 1998 and Reeve 1999). In addition,
the gene-level view of evolutionary processes (Dawkins 1976, 1982) generates ongoing
controversy and discussion (see, e.g., Sober and Wilson, 1998, pp. 87-92).
Here we hope to avoid these controversies at least partially by capturing the essential
nature of multilevel selection within a more fundamental framework that does not depend
on genes or reciprocal altruism. The notion that a system (group) does better when it
achieves cooperation among its parts (individuals), often against the self-interest of those
parts, goes beyond just biological systems undergoing natural selection. It is applicable to
hierarchical systems across a variety of fields. The non-zero sum nature of aggregation is
general and optimization by subsystems often results in sub-optimization at a higher level
(see, e.g., Robertshaw et al, 1978, pp. 207-211). The “prisoners’ dilemma” (PD) from
game theory is often used to model such non-zero sum situations. Like Simpson’s
paradox, the PD involves an anomaly of composition. In the PD individually-rational
strategies, when aggregated, give a deficient collective outcome. In a recent book, Non-
Zero, Robert Wright (2000) boldly asserts that non-zero sum interactions are fundamental
to the genesis of higher levels of organization in biological and social systems. Here, we
more modestly argue that much of what is essential about the tension between
hierarchical levels in multilevel selection arises from the existence of non-zero sum
interactions. This highlights the similarities between biological and social systems and
may allow evolutionary biologists to make use of the extensive work done on
competition and cooperation in social systems (see, e.g., Hardin and Baden 1977).
Figure 1. Schematically illustrates the main finding of this paper: Simpson’s
paradox can be an emergent of the prisoner’s dilemma. “Appropriate conditions”
refers to appropriate PD payoff parameter values and initial conditions of group
structure.
As we shall discuss, many other researchers have used game theory via the PD (both 2-
player and n-player) to study the evolution of cooperation and altruism. In addition, as
noted above, Simpson’s paradox (even if not always identified as such) is important in
understanding multilevel selection. Here, for the first time as far as we know, a simple
relationship is demonstrated between the n-player PD, hierarchical population structure,
and Simpson’s paradox. Our main finding, illustrated in Figure 1, is that Simpson’s
Paradox emerges (transiently, but for a wide range of parameters) when a minimal group
structure is imposed on an n-player PD. This result is produced by a model which









Simpson’s Paradox and the N-Player PD
The model is based on only two parameters which are easily understood and which
correlate with the within-group and between-group selection components in multilevel
selection theory.
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
One of the principal ways to model cooperative or altruistic behavior is with game theory
(von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) and the most widely known game of game theory
is the PD. In this imaginary situation two prisoners have been arrested for a serious crime
and are being interrogated separately by the police. The prisoners cannot communicate
and neither knows what the other will do. If they cooperate with each other and keep
quiet there is only enough evidence to convict them of a lesser crime and they will both
do minimal jail time. If however one of them turns State’s evidence and rats on (defects
from) the other who remains silent, then the defector does no jail time, but the cooperator
receives a very harsh sentence. In the case where both confess (defect), they both receive
an intermediate amount of jail time.
Individual Rationality Leads to Collective Irrationality
The PD is represented by the payoff matrix in Table 1 below where the numbers
represent a positive measure of utility. It is simpler to think in terms of positive payoffs
rather than the negative payoff of jail time, but the essential features are the same. C
represents cooperation and D represents defection. The strategies for player 1 are
represented as rows and for player 2 as columns. The payoff values for each pair of
strategies that meet are listed as player 1 payoff/player 2 payoff.
Player 2
C D
Player 1 C 3/3 0/5
D 5/0 1/1
Table 1. Payoff matrix for a
2-player Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The PD is a non-zero sum game—the sum of the two players’ scores varies for different
strategy combinations. To understand the paradox at the heart of the PD, imagine player
one trying to decide what to do and using the payoff matrix to reason with as follows:
Regardless of what player 2 does, I should defect—by defecting I will get 5 instead of 3
if player 2 cooperates, or 1 instead of 0 if player 2 defects. Player 2 is in symmetrical
situation and rationally also chooses to defect. So each player follows this dominant
strategy and gets a payoff of 1, but if they had both cooperated they would have each
gotten a payoff of 3. The essential feature of the PD is that the dominant individually-
rational strategy for each player leads to a collective sub-optimal or irrational outcome.
This outcome (1/1) is non-Pareto optimal because there is another outcome (3/3) to the
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game that increases the utility of one player without cost to the other. In fact in this case,
both players can do better.
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Tit-for-Tat, and Reciprocal Altruism
The simulation experiments of the political scientist Robert Axelrod (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981, Axelrod 1984) addressed the question of whether individual rationality
would still favor defection if instead of playing just once or at random, players were
forced to play a series of iterated PD games. This work extended the idea of reciprocal
altruism (Trivers 1971), an earlier attempt to explain seemingly altruistic behavior
between non-relatives in terms of individual benefit. Axelrod sponsored a tournament in
which various strategies implemented in computer programs were played against each
other pair-wise in a round robin so that each program played every other program
including itself. Each pair-wise iterated game consisted of 200 interactions and the payoff
matrix was the one illustrated above in Table 1. Therefore two always-defect (ALLD)
strategies playing each other would get a score of 200 each, two always-cooperate
(ALLC) strategies playing each other would get a score of 600, and an ALLD playing an
ALLC would get respective scores of 1000 and 0. For a summary of subsequent studies
of the evolution of cooperation and altruism based on the iterated PD see Dugatkin (1997,
p. 25).
Surprisingly the simplest strategy in the Axelrod tournament turned out to also be the
best. Proposed by Anatol Rapoport, it is called Tit-for-Tat (TFT). This strategy
cooperates in the first interaction and then always plays the strategy its opponent used in
the last encounter. Consistent with the theory of reciprocal altruism, TFT players need the
capacity to remember previous actions by competitors, but unlike kin selection, no
similarity in genes is assumed. The TFT strategy is willing to cooperate, swift to punish a
defection, yet forgiving in that it will return to cooperation if its opponent makes the
sacrifice of cooperating while TFT is defecting.
Unfortunately, the reason that TFT came out on top has been widely misunderstood as
being due to its individual fitness or “unbeatability.” As Sober and Wilson (1998, pp. 85-
86), and even Rapoport have pointed out, TFT can never beat an opponent in any pair-
wise iterated interaction because it never defects unless it has already been on the short
end of a defection from its opponent. As Rapoport (1991, pp. 93) put it, “in every paired
encounter, Tit-for-Tat must either draw or lose. It can never win a paired encounter.” In
this sense TFT is altruistic at the individual level because it often gives more points than
it gets and it never gains more than its opponent does.
The reason TFT won the tournament hinges on the fact that it often was able to play other
TFT or similar altruistic strategies where it could run up its accumulated score. So even
though in individual competition TFT is inferior, for example to ALLD which is the most
fit unexploitable individual strategy, pairs (groups) of TFT accumulate higher scores than
pairs (groups) of ALLD. In the analysis of why TFT was a successful strategy, (Axelrod
1984, p.33) does note that it tended to score especially well (close to 600) when it played
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similar strategies, but he does not recognize this as a group effect. Maynard Smith (1982,
p. 168) comments that, “the programs were ranked according to the total payoff
accumulated (not, it should be noted, according to the number of opponents defeated in
the individual matches).” Yet neither he nor Axelrod distinguish the individual and group
levels of competition present in this tournament which is obscured by the cumulative
method of scoring. Sober and Wilson (1998, pp. 102-116) emphasize the importance of
identifying and separating out the selective forces at different hierarchical levels. They
argue that much of the controversy surrounding group selection is due to a failure to do
so.
N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma (The Tragedy of the Commons)
The n-player, as opposed to 2-player, PD offers a straightforward way of thinking about
the tension between the individual and group levels. In real-world biological and social
systems the effects of cooperation or defection are often distributed diffusely to other
members of a group, i.e., they do not necessarily arise via pair-wise interactions. When
there is a common and finite resource, each individual benefits by using more than its
share of that resource, but when all players apply this individual rationality it can lead to
collective irrationality. For example, each country that fishes international waters can
increase its utility by taking more of the fish in this common resource, but as more and
more countries overfish, the common stock is depleted beyond where it can quickly
replenish and so in subsequent years all have less. This leads to decreased utility for both
countries that overfish (defectors) and those that don’t (cooperators). As another
example, imagine policyholders with theft insurance that successfully make false claims.
The benefit to an individual cheater is then paid for by an increase in premiums. The
more policyholders that cheat in this way, the higher the premiums and therefore the less
valuable the insurance is to both those that only make claims for true thefts (cooperators)
and cheaters (defectors). Finally, as an evolutionary example, consider social spiders that
vary in the sex ratio of their offspring (Aviles 1993). Within a group, spiders with an
even sex ratio in offspring (defectors) are more fit than spiders with biased sex ratios
(Fisher 1930), but groups that contain individuals biased towards female offspring
(cooperators) grow faster and therefore have the potential to do better collectively in
competing against groups where the sex ratio is even.
In their simplest form, these n-player examples include no clear role for a TFT strategy,
and thus no necessity to remember other players past actions and no reciprocal altruism.
However, generalized TFT strategies have been introduced into n-player PD models (see
Boyd and Richerson 1988, Joshi 1987, Motro 1991) to study reciprocal altruism. In
generalized TFT, a player cooperates at time t if a certain number of its group members
cooperated at time t – 1 or if the player received a certain level of payoff at t - 1. As with
the 2-player PD studies, the distinct within-group and between-group components
suggested by multilevel selection theory were not recognized in these studies. There is no
distinction made between high individual fitness scores achieved by exploiting others
within the same group and high fitness scores due to grouping with other cooperative or
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TFT-type strategies. In this paper, however, using the simplest n-player PD model
involving only the pure cooperate or defect strategies, we explicitly capture the individual
and group components of selection as two parameters in our model.
An n-player PD involving the exploitation of a common resource (e.g., the fisheries
example) is also known as the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968). A simple payoff
scheme for such an n-player PD is illustrated by Figure 2. On the horizontal axis is the
fraction of individuals cooperating for the common good. On the vertical axis is the
average utility to each individual. For convenience, we assume a linear relationship
between utility and percent cooperators. For instance, one can think of insurance
premiums going down linearly with the fraction of policyholders that refrain from
making false claims. Alternatively, one can think of the growth rate of a spider colony
increasing linearly with the number of members who have a female-biased sex ratio in
their offspring. The upper line denotes the utility for a defector while the lower line is the
utility for a cooperator. The defector’s line dominates the cooperator’s line, i.e., selfish
individual behavior always has a higher utility than cooperating no matter what the
fraction of cooperators. The resulting dynamic tends to decrease the number of
cooperators within a group.
Figure 2. Utility lines for defectors and cooperators as a function of the fraction of
cooperators for a simple n-player prisoner’s dilemma (PD).
The deficient outcome of the PD here inheres in the fact that the utility to defectors when
there is a minimum number of cooperators (point A) is lower than the utility to
cooperators when there is a maximum number of cooperators (point B). So even though
for a given state of the system an individual benefits more by defection than cooperation,







utility to individual cooperator
utility to individual defector
N-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Tragedy of the Commons)
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The “tragedy” (and what makes this a PD) is that whatever the current state of the
system, individual rationality or individual selection favors defection, which tends to
drive the system to a (boundary) equilibrium state less beneficial to all (point A). This
state is a non-Pareto, sub-optimal, and irrational collective outcome. To summarize
algebraically: UD(x) > UC(x) for all x (UD and UC are utility functions of the fraction of
cooperators, x) causes x to decrease for all x, but UC(1.0) > UD(0.0). The co-parallel lines
used here are the simplest of many cooperator and defector utility curves that can satisfy
these PD conditions.
Note that it may be tempting to think of cooperation as selfish rather than altruistic
because a group of all cooperators gets more utility per individual than a group of all
defectors, but this would be incorrect and misses the crux of the PD. In the 2-player PD,
the players would be better off if they both cooperate, but defecting is still the rational
individual strategy because the prisoners have no way to coordinate their actions and
enforce any agreements to cooperate. Cooperating is always disadvantageous no matter
what the other player does. So in the absence of guarantees of cooperation by other
players, cooperating is truly altruistic—it lowers one’s individual utility (fitness) while
raising the benefit to others. The same situation holds in the n-player game. Given the
absence of coordination between players, each player is better off to defect, but benefits
others by not doing so in that the system is kept at a state with a higher fraction of
cooperators. Of course, this is the dynamic for a single set of players, or for a multi-group
system viewed at the intra-group level. As we shall see, at the higher level of
organization, i.e. that of the total population which includes all groups, cooperators can
thrive, at least for a while, despite their inferior individual utility (fitness).
Simpson’s Paradox
At the University of California at Berkeley in the 1970s, the percentage of women
graduate school applicants accepted was significantly lower than the percentage of men
accepted (Cartwright 1978). Yet, when the University looked at each department they
found none were accepting a smaller percentage of women. The answer to this paradox
lies in the fact that different departments varied in their contribution to the whole.
Women were applying in greater numbers to departments that accepted a lower
percentage of applicants. For example, imagine that 70 women and 30 men apply to
department A which has 20 positions. If there is no bias with regard to sex, 14 women
and 6 men are accepted. Also, imagine that 30 women and 70 men apply to Department B
which has 50 positions. If there is no bias, 15 women and 35 men are accepted. However,
if we aggregate these results, 41 of 100 men are accepted, whereas only 29 of 100 women
are accepted. This is an example of Simpson’s paradox (Simpson 1951).
Like the PD, Simpson’s paradox hinges on an anomaly of aggregation. In the PD
aggregating individually rational strategies does not lead to a collectively rational
outcome. In Simpson’s paradox, aggregation yields results qualitatively different from
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those apparent at the lower level. As Sober and Wilson (1998, pp. 23-25) note, Simpson’s
paradox has direct implications for the debate over the evolution of altruism via group
selection. If group structure is not taken into account then averaging fitness across groups
which vary in their local fitness-relevant conditions may give paradoxical results. For
instance, in Axelrod’s iterated PD experiments accumulating individual scores in the
round robin tournament led TFT to appear the most individually fit even though TFT can
never win an iterated match.
A Simple Model of Dynamic Change in Altruistic Behavior
We now demonstrate that the PD and Simpson’s paradox are deeply linked by analyzing
a very simple (two parameter) model based on the n-player PD which, with the addition
of a minimal hierarchical structure, captures the essential tension between group and
individual-level selection. As mentioned earlier, the model is more general than
evolutionary models and does not involve inclusive fitness or reciprocal altruism.
In the simplest form of the model there are two groups with no migration between them.
These groups initially are the same size and vary only in their fraction of cooperators and
defectors. There are no other strategies besides ALLC and ALLD. We follow the
percentage of cooperators in each group and across the whole population. There are two
parameters that influence these dependent variables. The first is the slope of the utility
lines (see Figure 2). For simplicity we use linear and parallel utility functions. The slope
of both lines affects the disparity in utility for groups of different composition and can be
thought of as the magnitude of the group level selective force. At this level groups
containing more cooperators have the advantage. The second parameter is the difference
in the intercept for the cooperator’s and defector’s utility lines. Because the lines are
parallel, the intercept is the vertical displacement between them at all levels of
cooperation. This disparity in utility for defectors vs. cooperators within a group can be
thought of as the magnitude of the individual level selective force within each group. At
this level defectors have the advantage over cooperators.
This is a dynamic model and at each timestep the following action is implemented:
Within each group the number of cooperators is increased in proportion to the
cooperators’ utility based on the group’s composition. Similarly, the number of defectors
is increased in proportion to the defectors’ utility based on the group’s composition.
In addition, the population of each group is proportionally scaled back (preserving the
ratio of cooperators and defectors) so that the total population size matches the original
total. Scaling is unnecessary and does not do anything substantive, but it helps make the
dynamics clear. The changes in the percentage of cooperators and defectors in each group
and across the population is unchanged by uniform scaling, although it does have some
justification in terms of biological or economic carrying capacities. It is also worth noting
that although we have implemented the changes within groups as an increase in
population with a subsequent uniform scaling, the resulting changes in group size and
composition could also be thought of in terms of an optional behavior for cooperating or
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defecting within a fixed population where members might also be allowed to migrate to
other groups.
To calculate the utility (see Figure 2) we use:
• UCi = m fCi + bC
• UDi = m fCi + bD
where:
• UCi is the utility for a cooperator within group i
• UDi is the utility for a defector within a group i
• m is the slope of both the defector and cooperator utility lines
• fCi is the fraction of cooperators in group i
• bC is the intercept for the cooperator’s utility line (0 in our simulations)
• bD is the intercept for the defector’s utility line (≥ 0 in our simulations)
Note that keeping the cooperator’s intercept at 0.0 and the fact that the x-axis (fraction of
cooperators) of the utility functions varies from 0.0 to 1.0 means that here the condition
for a PD (e.g., point B above point A in Figure 2) is m > bD. In all runs reported in this
paper this condition is satisfied. The increase of each strategy within a group is directly
proportional to that strategy’s utility within the group, which equals the number of
individuals utilizing the strategy times its utility payoff per individual:
• NCi(t+1) = NCi(t) + NCi(t) UCi
• NDi(t+1) = NDi(t) + NDi(t) UDi
where:
• NCi is the number of cooperators in group i (before scaling)
• NDi is the number of defectors in group i (before scaling)
It is also useful to define N1 = NC1 + ND1,  NC  = NC1 + NC2,  N2  = NC2 + ND2, and
ND = ND1 + ND2.
An example of one timestep illustrates. For our initial conditions group 1 consists of 90
defectors and 10 cooperators and group 2 is composed of 10 defectors and 90
cooperators. For this example we use a slope of 1.0 and intercepts of 0.0 for cooperators
and 0.1 for defectors. Table 2 shows the results of one timestep based on the above
equations and description. The calculations of utilities at time 0 are shown below:
• UC1 = m fC1 + bC = (1.0)(0.1) + 0.0 = 0.1
• UD1 = m fC1 + bD = (1.0)(0.1) + 0.1 = 0.2
• UC2 = m fC2 + bC = (1.0)(0.9) + 0.0 = 0.9
• UD2 = m fC2 + bD = (1.0)(0.9) + 0.1 = 1.0
The population values before uniform scaling depend on the utilities and are calculated
below for the first timestep:
• NC1(1) = NC1(0) + NC1(0) UC1 = (10) + (10)(0.1) = 11
• ND1(1) = ND1(0) + ND1(0) UD1 = (90) + (90)(0.2) = 108
• NC2(1) = NC2(0) + NC2(0) UC2 = (90) + (90)(0.9) = 171
• ND2(1) = ND2(0) + ND2(0) UD2 = (10) + (10)(1.0) = 20
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The shaded cells in Table 2 show that after one timestep the percentage of cooperators in
group 1 has dropped from 10.0% to 9.2% and in group 2 from 90.0% to 89.5%, but the
overall percentage of cooperators has increased from 50.0% to 58.7%. This is an example
of Simpson’s paradox, which can be summarized algebraically as:
• NC(1) / N(1) > NC(0) / N(0)
even though
• NC1(1) / N1(1) < NC1(0) / N1(0)
• NC2(1) / N2(1) < NC2(0) / N2(0)
An observer who understood that population changes were due to utility (fitness)
differences, but ignored the group structure, would interpret this increase in cooperation
as indicating that cooperators were more fit than defectors. Yet it is obvious from Figure
2 that the utility (fitness) for defectors is always above that of cooperators regardless of
the fraction of cooperators within their group. Note that in the Berkeley example
Simpson’s paradox involves an effect seen at a higher (university) level but absent at the
lower (department) level, while here effects have opposite directions at the two levels:
cooperation is favored at the group level but not favored at the individual level.
Group 1 Group 2 Groups 1 and 2
Time C D %C C D %C C D %C
0 10 90 10 90 10 90 100 100 50
1* 11 108 9.2 171 20 89.5 182 128 58.7
1 7.1 69.7 9.2 110.3 12.9 89.5 117.4 12.9 58.7
Table 2. The number of cooperators (C), defectors (D), and percent cooperators (%C)
in each group at time 0, time 1* (before scaling), and time 1 (after scaling) for a slope
of 1.0 and a defector intercept of 0.1. The shaded cells highlight the changes in %C.
Experiments and Results
Because the utility for defectors is always higher than that for cooperators, in the long run
defectors will dominate both in each group and across the whole population. Yet we have
just seen that it is possible, while the percentage of cooperators decreases within each
group for the overall percentage of cooperators in the whole population to increase. This
effect is transient without mechanisms for reestablishing variation between groups.
Several such mechanisms have been proposed elsewhere; they include periodic random
founding of groups from a large breeding population (see Williams and Williams 1957,
Maynard Smith 1964), non-uniform population densities with viscosity (Mitteldorf and
Wilson 2000), groups that remain isolated and fission or bud (Aviles 1993), and various
methods of active altruist aggregation (see Sober and Wilson 1998).
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Figure 3. Population of cooperators and defectors in group 1, group 2, and total.
Figure 4. Percentage of cooperators in group 1, group 2, and total.
Here we keep things simple by just noting that (in the absence of the above mentioned
necessary mechanisms) the increase in altruistic behavior due to Simpson’s paradox is
transient. We explore how combinations of our two parameters affect the magnitude and
longevity of this effect. All of our experiments included here involve two groups with
initial conditions of 90 defectors and 10 cooperators in group 1 and 90 cooperators and
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10 defectors in group 2, but our results can be extended to other initial distributions as
will be discussed below. These population sizes can actually represent much larger
populations as we have allowed fractional numbers of players. Figure 3 shows the
beginning of a typical run with two groups where Simpson’s paradox is evident. Here the
slope of the utility lines are 0.01 and the intercept of the defectors’ line is 0.003.
Notice that in this run both the number of cooperators and defectors increase in group 2,
and decrease in group 1 up to about timestep 330. At this point there are 171 players in
group 2 (132.1 C, 38.9 D) and only 29 left in group 1 (1.2 C, 27.8 D). Since in the
beginning group 2 consists of mostly cooperators, the rapid expansion in group 2 causes
the overall number of cooperators to increase from 100 up to 133.3 or from 50% up to
66.6%. After timestep 330 the total population continues to be more and more dominated
by group 2, but the defectors in group 2 are steadily increasing. This causes the overall
number of cooperators to begin to shrink. By timestep 4,000 (not shown) the overall
percentage of cooperators is essentially zero (< 0.01%). Simpson’s paradox is easier to
see in Figure 4 which tracks the percentages of only the cooperators for the same run.
Notice that the percentage of cooperators in both group 1 and group 2 decrease, but the
overall percentage of cooperators initially increases.
Run 1 in Table 3 shows the data from the run used in Figures 3 and 4. Run 2 shows the
effect of increasing (to 0.05) the slope (group selection) while holding the intercept
(individual selection) constant. The magnitude of the Simpson’s paradox effect increases
as shown by the fact that the total percent cooperator peak increases (from 66.6% to
85.5%) and occurs sooner (121 compared to 328 timesteps). It is interesting to note that
the percentages of cooperators and defectors within each group after 100 timesteps are
not significantly affected by increasing the slope (7.6% cooperators in both Runs 1 and 2
and 87.0% and 87.1% defectors in Run 1 and Run 2 respectively). The percent
cooperators or defectors within a group is an individual selection phenomenon relatively
independent of the group forces, although the absolute numbers in each group are
affected by the slope change (72.9 in group 1 and 127.1 in group 2 in Run 1 vs. 5.0 in
group 1 and 195 in group 2 in Run 2).












initial conditions for all runs: 10.0 100.0 90.0 100.0
At timestep 100
1 0.01 0.003 66.6 328 7.6 72.9 87.0 127.1
2 0.05 0.003 85.5 121 7.6 5.0 87.1 195.0
3 0.01 0.001 82.4 520 9.1 65.7 89.1 134.3
4 1.0 0.3 70.2 6 0.0 0.4 0.0 199.6
5 0.0001 0.00003 66.6 32,501 10.0 99.7 90.0 100.3
6 0.01 0.008 50.0 0 4.8 92.2 80.3 107.8
Table 3. Results of various runs with varied slope and intercept. Shaded area shows
percent cooperators and total population of each group after 100 timesteps.
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Run 3 shows the effect of keeping the slope the same as in Run 1, but decreasing the
intercept. Recall that the intercept is a measure of within-group selection for all group
compositions because in this model the utility lines for cooperators and defectors are
parallel. Decreasing this within-group individual selection also increases the maximum
percent of overall cooperators reached (to 82.4%), but unlike the effect of increasing the
slope, decreasing the intercept also increases the amount of time to reach the peak (520
compared to 328 timesteps).
These results make sense in terms of our association of group selection and individual
selection with slope and intercept, respectively. Increasing the slope gives group 2 a
bigger advantage and leads group 2 to dominate the population sooner. Since the rate at
which defectors take over group 2 is a within-group phenomena based on the intercept
which is unchanged between Run 1 and Run 2, group 2 dominating the total sooner
(while it has more cooperators) leads to a higher maximum percentage of cooperators
reached overall and this peak is reached in a shorter time. In contrast, in comparing Runs
1 and 3 the intercept is decreased while the slope is held constant. This reduces the
advantage defectors have within a group. Here the maximum percentage of total
cooperators also increases, but not because group 2 dominates faster. Rather it is because
both groups have more cooperators for a longer time due to the decreased individual
advantage to defectors. This causes the peak in percent cooperators to be delayed. The
effects of the two parameters are most clearly seen at their lowest values. For zero slope,
no group will come to dominate. For zero intercept, the composition of cooperators and
defectors doesn’t change within each group.
Runs 4 and 5 in Table 3 demonstrate that the Simpson’s paradox effect is very robust
across our two parameter space, but also depends on the balance between the group-level
(slope) and the individual-level (intercept) factors. Run 4 shows a similar maximum total
cooperators peak to Run 1 (66.6% vs. 70.2%) where the slope and intercept are both
increased 100 fold to 1.0 and 0.3 respectively. Run 5 again shows a similar result to Run
1 (both 66.6%) when the slope and intercept are decreased 100 fold compared to Run 1,
to 0.0001 and 0.00003. Note again that the time to reach the maximum percent
cooperators happens much more quickly for the higher slope values. There are, however,
many parameter combinations where, for the initial conditions used in all these runs, the
intercept (individual effect) is too high for a given slope (group effect) and the overall
percentage of cooperators decreases monotonically. This case is represented by Run 6 in
Table 3. In this run there is a PD because m > bD (0.01 > 0.008), but no Simpson’s
paradox. In these simulations a PD is a necessary but not sufficient condition to get a
Simpson’s paradox effect.
To explore the effect of varying slope and intercept on the magnitude of Simpson’s
paradox, we did 651 runs systematically varying the parameter for slope from 0.0 to 0.2
in 0.01 increments and for intercept from 0.0 to 0.15 in 0.005 increments. Figure 5 shows
the peak values of total percent cooperators plotted on the z-axis. The results match our
expectations and again support the use of slope and intercept as representing the between-
group and within-group selective forces, respectively. The plane at the 50% mark
represents a region of parameter space where there is no Simpson’s paradox seen, where
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the individual selection (intercept) is high in relation to group selection (slope). In our
model, where for simplicity N1 = N2 = NC = ND, the condition for Simpson’s paradox
expressed in terms of our two parameters and initial conditions is:
• m / bD   > Ni2  / (NCi – NDi)2    where i = 1 or 2 (see Appendix A)
Any initial difference between groups in their cooperator and defector composition can,
with appropriate intercept and slope values, generate a Simpson’s paradox. For example,
initial conditions of 55 defectors and 45 cooperators in group 1, the opposite ratio in
group 2, a slope of 1.1, and an intercept of 0.01 produces Simpson’s paradox because the
condition 1.1 / 0.01 > 1002 / 102 is met. Our 10-90:90-10 initial distribution was just
chosen to make results easier to visualize. Note however, that the above condition is
derived specifically for our symmetrical initial distributions. We have not yet derived a
more general condition for any initial distribution.
It is clear from Figure 5 that increasing the slope for a given intercept leads to an increase
in the maximum attained overall percent cooperation (which cannot exceed the initial
percent cooperation in the cooperator-dominated group, here 90%). For a given level of
group selection (slope), decreasing the individual selection (intercept) also leads to a
higher level of cooperation reached. Although not shown here, as discussed above,
decreasing the intercept also slows down the time for defectors to take over within a
group. This extends the temporal length of the Simpson’s paradox effect as well as
increasing its magnitude.
Figure 5. Shows the results of 651 runs where slope and intercept were varied
systematically. The z-axis shows the maximum total percent cooperators reached
where the initial value was always 50%.
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Conclusions
Like the 2-player PD, the n-player PD illustrates how the aggregation of actions based on
individual rationality can lead to a sub-optimal or irrational collective outcome. This
model can be mapped onto many real-world situations in which the optimization of
subsystems does not lead to an optimal result at the system level. Here we have
demonstrated that by adding a minimal group structure onto the n-player PD, Simpson’s
paradox emerges such that the total percentage of cooperators can increase even though
within groups cooperation always gains less utility and steadily decreases relative to
defection. The maximum percentage of cooperators attained is a measure of the
magnitude of this effect. This increase in total percent cooperators is transient as
defectors eventually take over both groups and therefore the total population. We have
not yet added mechanisms which might sustain the increase in cooperators.
In its simplest form, this model has only two parameters: the slope of the utility lines and
the difference in their intercepts. For two groups that vary only in their initial
composition of cooperators and defectors, these parameters are analogous to the between-
group selection (slope) and within-group individual selection (intercept difference) in the
evolution of altruistic behavior via multilevel selection. Observing Simpson’s paradox
depends also on initial conditions in a predictable way. For any initial condition where
the groups differ (so far we have only examined symmetrical groups), a Simpson’s
paradox can be generated by a strong enough PD, i.e., by a slope sufficiently greater than
the intercept.
The model described in this paper is simpler than models of reciprocal altruism based on
the iterated 2-player and n-player PD in that here there are no actions conditioned on past
behaviors of other players. It is also more abstract than inclusive fitness models in that
there are no genes. An increase of altruism (in the PD) merely requires a suitable higher
level of organization. This is consistent with multilevel selection theory. Increasing the
slope (group selection parameter) increases the disparity between group size such that the
cooperator-dominated group increases and this accounts for the overall increase in
cooperators. Decreasing the intercept (individual selection parameter) causes cooperators
within each group to be sustained longer and therefore also contributes to an increase in
overall cooperators. This simple model lets us tease out the within-group and between-
group components of utility or fitness and is applicable to both biological and social
systems in which there is competition at multiple levels.
Further Research
We are continuing to explore the applicability and further elaboration of this model. This
includes:
• Exploring mechanisms that might give rise to and/or maintain high levels of
cooperation indefinitely, e.g., random re-assortment of groups, variable population
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density with viscosity, group fission or budding, and other methods of altruist
aggregation.
• Examining the dependence of the magnitude and longevity of the Simpson’s paradox
effect on initial conditions and model parameters.
• Exploring models with cooperator and defector utility curves other than straight lines.
• Examining the relationship between non-zero sum games other than the PD on the
evolution of altruism.
• Studying if and how this model might explicitly encompass reciprocal altruism and
inclusive fitness.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Andreas Rechtsteiner for a careful reading of an earlier draft of
this paper and fruitful discussions.
References
Aviles, L. (1993). “Interdemic Selection and the Sex Ratio: A Social Spider Perspective,”
The American Naturalist. 142(2):320-345.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York:Basic Books, Inc.
Axelrod, R. and Hamilton, W.D. (1981). “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Science.
211:1390-96.
Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J. (1988). “The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizeable Groups,”
Journal of Theoretical Biology. 132:337-356.
Cartwright, N. (1978). “Causal Laws and Effective Strategies,” Nous. 13:419-437.
Dawkins, R. (1976). The Selfish Gene. New York:Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of Selection.
Oxford:W.H. Freeman and Co.
Dugatkin, L.A. (1997). Cooperation Among Animals, An Evolutionary Perspective. New
York:Oxford University Press.
Fisher, R.A. (1930). The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. New York: Dover.
Hamilton, W.D. (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior I and II,” Journal
of Theoretical Biology. 7:1-52.
Hamilton, W.D. (1975). “Innate Social Aptitudes of Man: An Approach from
Evolutionary Genetics,” in Biosocial Anthropology, (R. Fox, ed.) New York:John
Wiley and Sons.
Hamilton, W.D. (1987). “Discriminating Nepotism: Expectable, Common, Overlooked,”
in Kin Recognition in Animals, (D.C. Fletcher, C.D. Michener, eds.) New York:John
Wiley and Sons.
Hardin, G. (1968). “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science. 162:1243-48.
Hardin, G. and Baden, J. (1977) Managing the Commons. San Francisco:W.H. Freeman
and Co.
Simpson’s Paradox and the N-Player PD
Joshi, N. V. (1987). “Evolution of Cooperation by Reciprocation within Structured
Demes,” Journal of Genetics. 66(1):69-84.
Maynard Smith, J. (1964). “Group Selection and Kin Selection,” Nature. 201:1145-1146.
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge:Cambridge
University Press.
Mitteldorf, J. and Wilson, D.S. (2000). “Population Viscosity and the Evolution of
To appear in Journal of Theoretical Biology.
Motro, U. (1991). “Cooperation and Defection: Playing the Field and the ESS,” Journal
of Theoretical Biology. 151:145-154.
Price, G.R. (1970). “Selection and Covariance,” Nature. 277:520-521.
Rapoport, A. (1991). “Ideological Commitments and Evolutionary Theory,” Journal of
Social Issues 47:83-99.
Reeve, H.K. (1999) “Multi-Level Selection and Human Cooperation,” Evolution and
Human Behavior. 21:65-72.
Robershaw, J.E., Mecca, S.J., and Rerick, M.N. (1978) Problem Solving: A Systems
Approach. New York:Petrocelli Books, Inc.
Simpson, E.H. (1951). “The Interpretation of Interaction in Contingency Tables,”
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B. 13:238-241.
Sober, E. and Wilson, D.S. (1998). Unto Others, The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.
Trivers, R.L. (1971). “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of
Biology. 46:35-57.
von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.
Princeton:Princeton University Press.
Wade, M.J. (1977) “An Experimental Study of Group Selection,” Evolution. 31:134-153.
Wade, M.J. (1978) “A Critical Review of the Models of Group Selection,” The Quarterly
Review of Biology. 53(2):101-114.
Wade, M.J. (1979) “The Primary Characteristics of Tribolium Populations Group
selected for Increased and Decreased population Size,” Evolution. 33(2):749-764.
Williams, G.C. and Williams, D.C. (1957). “Natural Selection of Individually Harmful
Social Adaptations Among Sibs with Special Reference to Social Insects,” Evolution
11:32-39.
Wilson, D.S. (1975) “A Theory of Group Selection,” Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science USA. 72(1):143-146.
Wilson, D.S. (1976) “Evolution on the Level of Communities,” Science. 192:1358-1360.
Wilson, D.S. (1977) “Structured Demes and the Evolution of Group-Advantagous
Traits,” The American Naturalist. 111(977):157-185.
Wright, R. (2000) Non-Zero, The Logic of Human Destiny. New York:Pantheon Books.
Wynne-Edwards, V.C. (1962). Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior.
Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd.
Simpson’s Paradox and the N-Player PD
Appendix A
Here we derive an expression for conditions necessary to produce Simpson’s paradox in
our model in terms of the initial conditions and the n-player PD parameters of slope and
intercept. We assume that the initial number of players in groups 1 and 2 are equal and
the initial distribution of cooperators and defectors is opposite and symmetrical in the two
groups.
First note that because the utility line for defectors dominates the utility line for
cooperators for all distributions of cooperators and defectors, the percentage of
cooperators within a group always decreases. So the condition for Simpson’s paradox
reduces to an initial increase in total cooperators that exceeds any increase in total
defectors or:
• ∆NC > ∆ND  (at t = 0)
The changes in cooperators and defectors in each group at t = 0 are given by the
following expressions:
• ∆NC1 = NC1  m NC1 / N1
• ∆NC2 = NC2  m NC2 / N2
• ∆ND1 = ND1 (m NC1/N1  +  bD)
• ∆ND2 = ND2 (m NC2/N2  +  bD)
Substituting into the above inequality and noting that ∆NC = ∆NC1 + ∆NC2  and ∆ND =
∆ND1 + ∆ND2, the condition for Simpson’s paradox is:
• m(NC12 / N1 + NC22 / N2) > m(ND1 NC1 / N1 + ND2 NC2 / N2) + bD(ND1 + ND2)
Note that for our simulations NC = ND = N1 = N2 and ND1 NC1 = ND2 NC2 so we can
express this inequality in terms of the initial conditions in group i (i = 1 or 2):
• (m / Ni) (NCi2 + NDi2) > (m / Ni) (2 NCi NDi) + bD Ni
• m (NCi2 - 2 NCi NDi+ NDi2) > bD Ni2
• m   (NCi – NDi)2 > bD Ni2
• m / bD   > Ni2  / (NCi – NDi)2
This is the condition for PD parameters and initial distributions in our simulation for
Simpson’s paradox to emerge.
